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NOTES
and for acquisitive prescription may be proved. This starting
point may only be found if there exists a permanent state of
affairs both on the servient estate and elsewhere so that no
question of precariousness may arise. Otherwise under the Lou-
isiana view, how is the court to know when the owner of the
servient estate might realize that the exercise of the servitude
is not a temporary thing, but one which the owner of the domi-
nant estate intends to continue to exercise by his own interven-
tion whenever necessary to replenish the water supply, or reset
the state of affairs?
The holding in the Wild case can possibly be justified in the
light of public policy to protect the rice industry. To hold that
rice farmers have not prescribed for rice irrigation outlets would
work grave hardship because irreplaceable drainage canals might
be lost. Apparently this policy decision demanded enlargement
of the concept of continuous servitudes to include drainage from
dominant estate rice fields flooded periodically by acts of man.
But the Wild case is inconsistent with the requirement of a
permanent state of affairs for possession and continuity. It is
submitted that the French view is more consistent with the
spirit of the code provisions.
John C. Blackman
SUSPENSIVE APPEAL IN EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS
A pipeline corporation brought an action to expropriate a
servitude. The defendant challenged the right to expropriate as
well as the necessity for the taking. From an adverse judgment
the landowner sought a suspensive appeal. The court of appeal
denied the motion on the basis that Acts 92, 93, and 108 of 1960
had abolished suspensive appeals in expropriation proceedings.'
The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari. In the first
hearing the court held that "the legislative fiat abolishing sus-
pensive appeals in all expropriation cases is violative of limita-
tions contained in Section 2 of Article 1 and Section 15 of Arti-
cle 4 of our [Louisiana's] Constitution." 2 No property can be
1. LA. R.S. 19:13 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1954, No. 706, § 1; La.
Acts 1960, No. 108, § 1; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2634 (1870), as amended, La. Acts
1954, No. 705, § 1; La. Acts 1960, No. 92, § 1; LA. CIvI. CODE art. 2636 (1870),
as amended, La. Acts 1960, No. 93, § 1.
2. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Violet Trapping Co., 248 La. 49,
72, 176 So.2d 425, 433-34 (1965).
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taken except for a public purpose and after just and adequate
compensation is previously paid. On rehearing the court reversed
itself, holding that there is no constitutional right to a suspen-
sive appeal in expropriation proceedings. Tennessee Gas Trans-
mission Co. v. Violet Trapping Co., 248 La. 49, 176 So.2d 425
(1965).
The statutes in question were in response to a series of deci-
sions which held that a defendant, in an expropriation suit, was
entitled to a suspensive appeal whenever he was contesting the
right to condemn.3 The prior jurisprudence was not based on
constitutional grounds but rather on a somewhat tenuous inter-
pretation of Louisiana Civil Code article 2634 which then read:
"Any appeal to the Supreme Court from the verdict of a
jury and judgment of the lower court, made by either party,
shall not suspend the execution of such judgment . . . but
in the event of any change being made by the final decree
in the decision of the cause, the corporation shall be bound
to pay the additional assessment, or be entitled to recover
back the surplus paid."
The court reasoned that the last sentence showed an intent
to limit application to situations where right to expropriate was
conceded, or the compensation and severance damages to be paid
were contested.4 The instant case was the first time the court
determined the constitutionality of an act abolishing suspensive
appeals in expropriation proceedings.
In the original hearing, the court did not hold that the denial
of a suspensive appeal was violative of either state or federal
procedural due process. On the contrary, the court conceded
that due process is met when an opportunity for a full and com-
plete hearing has been afforded.5 Furthermore, the court noted
that federal due process does not guarantee a right of appeal;6
a fortiori, it does not guarantee a suspensive appeal. The court,
3. Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Crowley, 223 La. 672, 66 So.2d 588(1953); Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Wyatt Lumber Co., 221 La. 886,
60 So.2d 713 (1952); Rapides Central Ry. v. Missouri Pacific Ry., 209 La. 26,
25 So.2d 828 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946), appeal transferred, 209 La. 26, 24 So.2d
240 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946); Louisiana Highway Commission v. Hays' Heirs,
186 La. 398, 172 So. 432 (1937); Orleans-Kenner Electric Ry. v. Metairie
Ridge Nursery Co., 136 La. 968, 68 So. 93 (1915).
4. Orleans-Kenner Electric Ry. v. Metairie Ridge Nursery Co., 136 La.
968, 68 So. 93 (1915).




however, recognized that the Louisiana Constitution guaranteed
a right of appeal if jurisdictional requirements are met.?
The majority in the first hearing relied on constitutional
provisions: 8 "private property shall not be taken or damaged
except for public purposes and after just and adequate compen-
sation is paid"; "nor shall vested rights be divested, unless for
purposes of public utility and for just and adequate compensa-
tion previously paid." The court first reasoned that since a denial
of suspensive appeal divests ownership prior to a final determina-
tion as to the public purpose, the right to expropriate, or the
adequacy of compensation, the defendant has not had the full
protection of his constitutional rights. The court implies that
until a judgment is final as to the right to expropriate or the
adequacy of compensation the expropriator has no property right
and therefore no right of possession. The court in the first hear-
ing relied on State through Sabine River Authority v. Phares,9
which held unconstitutional an act giving this agency the right
to take possession of property upon depositing the appraised
market value and estimated severance damages. The legislature
in this act had given the Sabine River Authority the right to
exercise the "quick taking" procedure. 0 The court conceded
that the two cases were distinguishable; in the present there
had been a hearing before a court of first instance whereas in
the Phares case there had been a taking prior to adversary
litigation. The court found the distinction irrelevant, however,
finding in both situations a taking prior to final disposition which
infringed on the constitutional restrictions.
On rehearing, the court reversed itself. It met the argu-
ments put forth in the original hearing by stating that there
is not a taking within the meaning of the constitution, since
the pending devolutive appeal prevents it from becoming absolute
until a final determination of the issues raised. The court held
that all the company acquires before final judgment is an
"inchoate" title. Thus the court read the provision to prevent
only a "final and absolute" taking prior to payment.
The majority cited, at length, Cherokee Nation v. Southern
7. LA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 10, 29, 36.
. Id. art. I, § 2; art. IV, § 15.
9. State, Through Sabine River Authority v. Phares, 245 La. 534, 159
So.2d 144 (1964).
10. The "Quick-Taking" procedure Is limited to property taken for
highway purposes. LA. CONST. art VI, § 19.1.
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Kansas Railway Co." in which the United States Supreme Court
held that an act of Congress granting a right of way through
Indian territory did not violate that part of the fifth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution which provides "nor
shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation." The case stands for the well-recognized fact that
the fifth amendment does not require payment prior to the
occupancy of the land taken.
The court concluded with perhaps the most persuasive
rationale behind the decisions. The court stated:
"It is a matter of common knowledge that natural gas is
one of the major products of Louisiana, consumed in large
volumes by the public and by industry; it is a major source
of revenue not only to the State of Louisiana, but also to
the thousands of royalty owners throughout the State.
"To hold LSA-R.S. 19:13, as amended, and Articles 2634
and 2636 of the Revised Civil Code, as amended, unconsti-
tutional, grant defendant a suspensive appeal, and prevent
plaintiff from entering upon defendant's property under the
circumstances of this case would not only be against the
great weight of authority, but would also be against public
policy." (Emphasis added.)12
It is submitted that the case represents a judicial recogni-
tion of a public need for a speedy and simplified expropriation
procedure-a need which produced the legislative acts referred
to above and which has predicated numerous revisions of
expropriation procedure in the past. This need distinguishes
procedure in expropriation from other types of civil proceed-
ings.' The court's purported reliance on prior decisions by the
Supreme Court hardly seems appropriate since the Federal Con-
stitution contains no provision requiring payment prior to the
taking. Moreover, the court in the original hearing conceded
that the Federal Constitution contains no guarantee of a suspen-
sive appeal in expropriation proceedings. The court also pur-
ported to rely on the "inchoate title theory" but failed to consider
11. Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Ry., 135 U.S. 641 (1890).
12. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Violet Trapping Co., 248 La. 49,
107, 176 So.2d 425, 446 (1965).
13. E.g., the possibility of a jury trial has been removed. LA. R.S. 19:4(1950). The delay for filing an answer is ten days instead of the usual
fifteen. Id. 19:6. Judgment must be rendered within 48 hours after the
completion of trial. Id. 19:10.
[Vol. XXVIII
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the actual language of the amendments in question, which
state: "Payment to the owner of the amount awarded ... or
deposit thereof in the registry of the court, entitles the plaintiff
to the property described in the same manner as would a volun-
tary conveyance."14 (Emphasis added.) Thus, it would seem that
under the statute title does pass to the expropriating authority.
Therefore, the only rationale left is the public need for a
relatively fast method of acquiring property for needed public
improvements.15 Though the majority was somewhat unrespon-
sive to the arguments made by the dissenting judges, the decision
appears sound because of present day conditions which require
public improvements to progress rapidly enough to handle our
increasing population. Moreover, the practical consequences of
the decision from the landowner's point of view are not as
harsh as they might first seem. The chance of success in a
plea of no right to expropriate, no necessity for the project, or
no public purpose is practically nil.1 And, if the sole issue
on appeal is the value of the land taken or amount of severance
damages, there is no need for a suspensive appeal, since the
landowner will suffer no harm by giving up possession prior
to the final determination. In effect, all the decision does is
14. LA. R.S. 19:13 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1954, No. 706, § 1; La.
Acts 1960, No. 108, § 1; L& CivL CODE art. 2834 (1870), as amended, La. Acts
1954, No. 705, § 1; La. Acts 1960, No. 92, § 1.
15. Cf. State, Through Sabine River Authority v. Phares, 245 La. 534,
159 So.2d 144 (1964) (dissenting opinion). Justice Hawthorne, a member
of the majority in the instant case, seemed to state that all that the above-
quoted constitutional provisions require is that just and adequate compensa-
tion, ascertained in a reasonable manner, be made available to the owner
prior to the taking. Hence, the constitution would be satisfied if the
appraised amount were deposited either prior to or after trial. And,
a fortiori, there would be no right of a suspensive appeal. This would be
in accord with the solution reached in most other jurisdictions and would
perhaps offer a sounder basis upon which to rest the decision in the instant
case. See also Hawthorne's dissent in the first hearing in the instant case.
Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Violet Trapping Co., 248 La. 49, 78,
176 So.2d 425, 434 (1965).
16. Objections aimed at challenging the right of the taker to expropriate
are generally taken care of by the elementary principle that federal and
state governments have constitutional authority to delegate power of
eminent domain, through designated agencies, to certain classes of entities
that serve public necessity and convenience. E.g., Texas Gas Transmission
Co. v. Pierce, 192 So.2d 561 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966); Texas Pipe Line Co. v.
Stein, 190 So.2d 244 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966) (objections phrased under the
general prerequisite of necessity aimed at challenging the location are
disposed of by the well-recognized rule that the court will not interfere
with the considerable discretion of the condemnor in choosing one location
over another in the absence of fraud, bad faith, or conduct amounting to an
abuse of privilege); Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Bowie Lumber
Co., 176 So.2d 735 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965) (challenging the public purpose
alleged or the necessity of the project are usually disposed of by citing
the rule that a public purpose does not mean actual public use).
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remove the procedural weapon commonly known as a "hold up"
suit, i.e., dilatory tactics aimed at taking advantage of the fact
that there is usually considerable pressure on the condemnor
to complete the project within a limited time.
Robert W. Collings
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION -OCCUPATIONAL DIsEAS-
DISABILITY OF EMPLOYEE
Plaintiff, a sandblaster and painter continuing to perform
his duties without pain or discomfort, sought workmen's com-
pensation benefits for disability allegedly resulting from silicosis.1
The district judge reasoned that even if plaintiff had contracted
the disease he had not become disabled by it. The court of appeal
reversed, holding that plaintiff was disabled though he could
still perform his duties without pain or discomfort. The Lou-
isiana Supreme Court non-suited the plaintiff, and held that
since plaintiff continued satisfactory performance of his duties
with the same employer, without undue pain or discomfort,
he could not recover because there was no factual disability.
LaCoste v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 250 La. 43, 193 So.2d 779
(1967).
Factual v. Legal Disability
Louisiana's occupational disease compensation statute2 re-
moves the necessity of proving an "accident" in occupational
disease situations; proof of contraction of one of the listed
diseases will satisfy this requirement. Once contraction has
been proved the employee need only show resulting disability
to recover compensation benefits.8 Since the statute equates
disabling injuries with disabling diseases, the jurisprudence
1. Silicosis is one of the occupational diseases listed in LA. R.S. 23:1031.1
(1950), added by amendment, La. Acts 1952, No. 532, 9 1, which provides
in part: "A. Every employee who is disabled because of the contraction
of an occupational disease as herein defined .. . shall be entitled to the
compensation provided in this Chapter the same as if said employee received
personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his em-
ployment.
"B. An occupational disease shall include only those diseases herein-
after listed when contracted by an employee in the course of his employ-
ment as a result of the nature of the work performed."
2. LA. R.S. 23:1031.1 (Supp. 1966), added by amendment, La. Acts 1952,
No. 532, 1 L
3. See MALONE, LOUSIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 218 (Supp. 1964).
